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INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, insurance coverage litigation regarding environmental liability has become big business. The impetus for this
boom in coverage litigation was the passage of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA"). 1 CERCLA imposes liability for actual and
"threatened" environmental contamination that is not only strict
liability, but also liability without traditional proximate causation.2
CERCLA also applies retroactively so that businesses are held liable today for practices that were legal at the time they were
conducted.3
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
armed with CERCLA, has placed numerous contaminated sites
onto its National Priorities List ("NPL"), a listing of the nation's
most contaminated sites.4 To effect a cleanup of each of these sites,
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1991).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(d) (1991).
4. Thomas Reiter et al., The Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying the
Course, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1170-71 (1991). The EPA has placed 1,200 sites on the
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the EPA usually designates as many liable parties as it can identify,
called "responsible parties" under the statute, and orders these
parties to clean the site. At many sites, there are more than one
hundred responsible parties. If responsible parties refuse to perform the required cleanups, often costing tens of millions of dollars, the EPA has the power to clean the site itself and then sue
under CERCLA for reimbursement of its costs plus penalties.5
Faced with such broad, retroactive, strict liability, responsible
parties around the country have turned to their comprehensive
general liability ("CGL") insurers for coverage. CGL policies
cover liability for bodily injury or property damage taking place
during a designated policy period. Many of the contaminated sites
sought to be cleaned by the EPA were polluted during the 1960s
and 1970s. Hence, responsible parties today are calling upon their
CGL insurers who issued policies during the 1960s and 1970s to
cover their costs for these cleanups.
Most CGL policies issued after 1970 contain a standard-form
"pollution exclusion,"'6 the focus of this Article. The 1970 pollution exclusion has caused widespread confusion as to when CGL
insurance covers CERCLA liability. Different state courts of last
resort disagree as to its meaning;7 appellate courts within states,
such as Illinois, disagree as to its meaning;8 and even some federal
courts have refused to follow the interpretation of the exclusion by
the appellate courts of the states in which they sit. 9
Seven state supreme court decisions that have construed the
1970 pollution exclusion illustrate the confusing nature of the
clause. The highest courts of Georgia,' 0 Wisconsin," and Colorado' 2 have interpreted the exclusion narrowly, finding coverage
for most CERCLA liability. In contrast, the highest courts of
NPL with each site projected to cost an average $29 million to clean up, and it estimates
that 2,100 sites will appear on the NPL by the year 2000. Id.
5. Id. The EPA originally estimated the total cleanup bill for industry under CERCLA at approximately $8 million, but more recent estimates range from $150 billion to
$700 billion. Id.
6. See infra text accompanying note 24.
7. See infra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1990)
(specifically rejecting the Michigan Appellate Court decision in Jonesville Prod., Inc. v.
Transamerica Ins. Group, 402 N.W.2d 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)).
10. Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989).
11. Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
12. Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1991).
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North Carolina,. 3 New York, 14 Michigan,'" and Massachusetts 6
have interpreted the exclusion broadly, blocking coverage for most
CERCLA liability. This confusion exists because the 1970 pollution exclusion contains numerous ambiguities, any one of which
can alter the result in a particular case depending on which of the
two or more available meanings a court chooses to apply. Clearly,
no consensus has yet emerged to resolve this confusion.
The question of how to interpret the 1970 pollution exclusion
most likely will continue to be widely litigated in the foreseeable
future. As of this writing, the highest courts of Illinois 17 and
Ohio"8 have accepted appeals in which they are expected to interpret the 1970 pollution exclusion, and the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals has certified a question concerning the interpretation of
the 1970 pollution exclusion to the Supreme Court of Florida. 19
Much of the confusion in the courts has resulted because courts
have failed to recognize one or more of the numerous ambiguities
contained in the pollution exclusion clause and have consequently
chosen coverage-defeating interpretations. 20 The only way for a
court to find its way through this labyrinth of ambiguity is for it
first to identify carefully the numerous ambiguities. 2' Then, in accordance with black letter insurance law, a court should construe
these ambiguities in favor of the policyholder, because the language
in question is an exclusion and has been principally drafted by insurance industry experts.22
There are three major ambiguities within the pollution exclusion
clause which cause most of the confusion. Once courts recognize
these ambiguities and construe them in favor of the policyholder,
clear rules emerge: policyholders who did not proximately cause
discharges of pollutants should be covered; policyholders who in13. Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C.
1986).
14. Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y. 1989).
15. Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., Nos. 86906, 86907, 86908, 1991 Mich.
LEXIS 1811 (Mich. Aug. 26, 1991).
16. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass.
1990).
17. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.E.2d 1154 (Ill. App. Ct.),
appeal granted, 575 N.E.2d 917 (Ill. 1991).
18. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 574 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio July 3,
1991) (Table, No. 91-641).
19. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc., 935 F.2d 240 (1 1th
Cir. 1991).
20. See infra part III.
21. See infra part III.
22. See infra part III.

The 1970 Pollution Exclusion

1991]

tentionally caused discharges of pollutants should not be covered;
and policyholders who unintentionally, but nevertheless, proximately caused discharges of pollutants should be covered, except
when the policyholder was aware of a substantial probability that it
was causing a discharge of pollutants.23

A.

II. BACKGROUND
The Pollution Exclusion Clause

Drafted by industry experts in 1970, the standard-form pollution
exclusion states:
This insurance does not apply: ... to bodily injury or property

damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse
or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.24
As is apparent from this language, the insurance industry's 1970
standard-form pollution exclusion is only a partial exclusion. It
provides coverage for some environmental claims, but does not
provide coverage for others. Far from fulfilling its purpose of delineating which environmental claims against a policyholder are
covered and which are not, the 1970 pollution exclusion has caused
widespread confusion.25
23. See infra part IV.
24. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co. of Ill., 535
N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 1989). The insurance industry's usual procedure for drafting and adopting new policy language provides
the reason why the above-quoted exclusion is in such widespread use, and hence, today
the subject of judicial construction in every state of the Union. Typically, new policy
language is first drafted by a large insurance trade organization, currently the Insurance
Services Office. That organization then solicits approval of that policy language from
each state's Commissioner of Insurance for use in each of the 50 states. Once approval is
granted in a particular state, individual insurance companies may then incorporate the
new language into their policies. Individual insurance companies can and do make individual filings with state Insurance Commissioners, but this is the exception rather than
the rule. The particular drafting and approval history of the 1970 pollution exclusion has
been the subject of numerous articles and has figured prominently in several court decisions construing the exclusion. For an excellent summary and discussion of the 1970
pollution exclusion drafting and approval history uncovered to date, see Reiter et al.,
supra note 4, at 1174.
25. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
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The Guiding Principleof Construction of Insurance Policy
Provisions, Especially Exclusionary Provisions, Is That26
Ambiguities Must Be Construed in Favor of Coverage

Courts consistently have adhered to the rule that ambiguities in
an insurance policy should be construed in favor of coverage when
interpreting insurance policy language susceptible to numerous
meanings, such as the 1970 pollution exclusion. Most recently, the
Illinois Supreme Court stated that an insurance policy's "provision
is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. All doubts and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the
27
insured."
The policy reasons for this rule are twofold. First, as with the
pollution exclusion clause in this case, the insurer or an insurance
industry trade association drafted the disputed policy terms, and
thus had the opportunity to make any vague or ambiguous terms
more specific.2" More importantly, it is established public policy
that insurance forfeitures are disfavored.29
The rule requiring construction of ambiguous terms in favor of
coverage is especially applicable to ambiguous exclusionary
clauses30 because exclusions attempt to limit an insurer's liability.
Consequently, exclusions are contrary to the primary purpose of
insurance, which is to protect the insured and the public. 31 Courts,
therefore, should identify any relevant ambiguities and construe
them in favor of coverage, especially when an exclusionary clause
is at issue.
This Article will first describe the ambiguities inherent in the
1970 pollution exclusion. Next, it will apply black letter insurance
law principles to the ambiguities so that ambiguous portions of the
26. For general propositions of law, this Article will cite to Illinois cases. Although
there is some variation, these general propositions hold true in other jurisdictions as well.
27. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926 (Ill.
1991); see also Dora Township v. Indiana Ins. Co., 400 N.E.2d 921 (Ill. 1980); Bellmer by
Bellmer v. Charter Sec. Life Ins. Co., 488 N.E.2d 1338 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
28. See Dora Township, 400 N.E.2d at 922.
29. Bellmer, 488 N.E.2d at 1340. As the Bellmer court stated:
Insurance forfeitures are disfavored as insurance serves important functions in
contemporary society and, even in doubtful cases, courts should be quick to find
facts which support coverage; and language of the policy should be liberally
construed in favor of coverage, toward the end that the insured is not deprived
of the benefit of insurance for which [it] paid.
Id. (citation omitted).
30. See Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Martin, 467 N.E.2d 287, 289 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984)
(involving the 1970 pollution exclusion); Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 458
N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (involving homeowner coverage for water damage).
31. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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pollution exclusion are construed in favor of coverage. This Article will then review and analyze court decisions that discuss these
ambiguities. Finally, by combining the above analyses, this Article
will propose a clear interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause
that is capable of performing the clause's function of delineating
which environmental claims are covered and which are not.
III.

ANALYSIS

The 1970 pollution exclusion contains three major ambiguities.
The first is whether the exclusion applies to defeat a policyholder's
coverage for the polluting acts of third parties, or whether the exclusion is limited to defeating coverage only for the insured's polluting acts. The second ambiguity involves the meaning of
accidental discharge. The third, and most complicated ambiguity,
concerns the meaning of sudden discharge.
A.

The 1970 Pollution Exclusion Is Ambiguous as to Whether it
Applies Only to the Insured's PollutingActs or to the
PollutingActs of Others as Well

The 1970 pollution exclusion consists of two parts. The first
part describes the scope of coverage generally taken away by the
exclusion; namely, that the coverage does not apply "to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of [pollutants]. '3 2 The second part places a
limitation on the scope of the exclusion; namely, that the exclusion
does not apply "if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental. '3 3 The first part, therefore, concerns
whether the exclusion applies at all, and the second part limits the
scope of the exclusion once it is determined to apply.
The first part of the exclusion contains an important ambiguity
in the form of an omission. It merely states that coverage does not
apply to bodily injury or property damage "arising out of the discharge, . . . [of pollutants]."
The exclusion does not specify
whether it only applies to "the discharge, dispersal, release or escape [caused by the policyholder]" or whether it also applies to
"the discharge, dispersal, release or escape [caused by anyone]."
The reader must choose only one construction when interpreting
this language because, for a pollution claim to be brought against a
policyholder, someone must have proximately caused the discharge
32.
33.

See supra text accompanying note 24.
See supra text accompanying note 24.
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of pollutants.3 4
The First District of the Illinois Appellate Court, in United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co. of Illinois,3 recently recognized this ambiguity when deciding whether
such policy language applies only to the insured's polluting acts or
whether it also includes the polluting acts of third parties.36 After
reviewing the history of the pollution exclusion, the court found it
unclear whether the policy was to apply only to an insured who
actively pollutes. 3" Accordingly, the court construed the ambiguities against the insurer in favor of coverage for the insured. 38 The
Specialty Coatings court was correct to recognize this ambiguity.
Courts have consistently found that a "failure to specify" in contract language constitutes an ambiguity. 39 The 1970 pollution ex34.
35.
36.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
535 N.E.2d 1071 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 133 (I11. 1989).
Id. at 1075-76. The Specialty Coatings court stated:
Defendants contend that the policy language does not make the exclusion
applicable to them since the exclusion language does not specify whether it applies only when the insured actively discharges, dispenses [sic], releases or
causes to escape pollutants, which defendants are not charged with, or that the
exclusion was intended to apply even when the polluting acts were performed
by a third party, as here....
It is not clear from the circumstances of this case, and from the underwriting
history of the exclusionary clause to which we will later refer, that the parties
intended the exclusionary clause to apply whether the insured was an active
polluter or not.
.This ambiguity must be resolved against [the insurer] in consonance with
the authorities previously cited.

Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., De Kalb Bank v. Purdy, 520 N.E.2d 957, 963 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 530 N.E.2d 243 (Ill. 1988). In De Kalb Bank, the parties disputed the meaning of
a farm lease. The lease required the lessee to pay rent as follows: "The sum of $25,000.00
on or before the date hereof [and] 35 bushels of corn per tillable acre." Id. At the appropriate time, the lessee provided the landlord with 35 bushels of "wet corn." Id. The
landlord maintained that he should have been paid with "Number 2 corn." Id. The
difference is that wet corn has not gone through a drying process and Number 2 corn has.
Thus, a bushel of Number 2 corn holds more than a bushel of wet corn. The lessee
argued that the lease did not specify whether the rent was to be paid in wet corn or in
Number 2 corn, and since wet corn was in fact "corn," he had fulfilled his part of the
bargain. Id. at 964. The court rejected this argument, holding that the lack of specificity
in the lease constituted an ambiguity. Id.
Discussion of other ambiguous terms occurs in Stamatakis Indus., Inc. v. King, 520
N.E.2d 770 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (covenant not to compete against employer did not specify which of numerous businesses of employer could not be engaged in by former employee), and American Nat'l Bank v. Olympic Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 377 N.E.2d 255 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978) (lease termination provision did not specify when limited six-month termination period began).
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clusion fails to specify whether it applies only with respect to
discharges caused by the policyholder or to discharges caused by
third persons as well. This failure to specify is an ambiguity.
Under the guiding principles of construction, this ambiguity must
be construed in favor of coverage. This ambiguity, therefore,
should be construed narrowly so that the exclusion only applies in
situations where the policyholder proximately caused the discharges of pollutants.
Numerous other courts have also recognized this particular ambiguity. 40 For example, in Covington Township v. Pacific Employers
Insurance Co. ,41 the court determined that the pollution exclusion
was ambiguous as to whether it applies only when the named insured discharges waste material.42 Citing the accepted principle
that "ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be strictly construed
against the insurer," the court resolved the ambiguity in favor of
the insured.43
In addition, a review of the nature of environmental liability ex40. See Centennial Ins. Co. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., No. M89-410, slip op.
(N.D. Ind., January 7, 1991); Covington Township v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 639 F.
Supp. 793, 799-800 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Payne v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F.
Supp. 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Safe Harbor Enter., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., No. 90-1099-CA-03, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct., May 13, 1991); Thompson v. Temple,
580 So. 2d 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 456
N.Y.S.2d. 504 (App. Div. 1982); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 N.Y.S.2d
538 (App. Div. 1981).
41. 639 F. Supp. 793 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
42. Id. at 799-800. The court reasoned:
Assuming arguendo that the contamination of the water supply was not sudden
or accidental, the theories of liability contained in the eight (8) lawsuits are not
predicated solely on plaintiff's discharge, etc. of waste material into the water
supply.
While damages resulting from a failure to monitor, etc., arguably still could
be said to arise from a discharge of waste material, the seventh exclusion apparently applies only when a named insured discharges etc., waste material. At
best, the seventh exclusion is ambiguous....
.. . Again, ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be strictly construed
against the insurer. Concededly, the discharge of waste material into the water
supply is the immediate cause of the injuries alleged in the third-party complaints. The damages sought from plaintiff, however, are based on plaintiff's
acts or omissions in discharging its public entity duties, i.e., monitoring the
water supply and issuing sewage permits. While both readings of the seventh
exclusion may be plausible, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of plaintiff.
Accordingly, considering the allegations of the eight (8) third-party complaints,
the court finds that the seventh exclusion does not relieve defendant of its duty
to defend claims based on the discharge, etc., of waste material by those other
than the named insured.
Id. (citations omitted).
43. Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 23

isting at the time the pollution exclusion was drafted also sheds
light on this ambiguity. As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in
Glidden v. FarmersAutomobile Insurance Ass'n:" "An insurance
policy is not to be interpreted in a factual vacuum; it is issued
under given factual circumstances. What at first blush might appear unambiguous in the insurance contract might not be such in
the particular factual setting in which the contract was issued."45
Hence, to determine the scope of coverage, it is appropriate to review the legal theories under which policyholders were held liable
at the time the pollution exclusion was drafted.
This review demonstrates that the pollution exclusion could not
have been intended to apply to policyholders when third parties
proximately caused discharges of pollutants. The pollution exclusion was drafted and submitted to state regulatory authorities for
approval in May of 1970. 6 As will be demonstrated below, in
1970, a policyholder could not be held liable in a pollution case
where the discharge of pollutants was proximately caused by the
acts of a third party.
In 1970, relatively few legal theories were available to impose
liability on policyholders for environmental contamination. The
only available theories were negligence, public and private nuisance, trespass, strict liability, and violation of riparian rights.47
These various theories imposed liability on defendants for intentional acts, negligent acts, and sometimes even for innocent acts.4"
All of these theories, however, retained the requirement that a defendant must have proximately caused the pollution to be held liable.49 In 1970, therefore, a plaintiff's failure to establish proximate
cause was a complete defense to any environmental claim.
Further, in 1970, a defendant had a complete defense to any tort
claim if it could show that the damage complained of was proximately caused solely by the acts of a third party. This was true
44. 312 N.E.2d 247 (Ill. 1974).
45. Id. at 250.
46. Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Wis. 1990).
47. See Patrick E. Murphy, EnvironmentalLaw: New Legal Concepts in the Antipollution Fight, 36 Mo. L. REV. 78 (1971). Our research has not revealed any state or
federal statutes in effect prior to 1970 that imposed liability on defendants for environmental contamination caused by third parties.

48. See Murphy, supra note 47, at 79.
49. See, e.g., Olympia Oyster Co. v. Rayonier, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Wash.
1964) (trespass and nuisance); City of Henryetta v. Runyan, 249 P.2d 425 (Okla. 1952)
(negligence); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 918 (1960) (strict liability).
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whether the tort claim sounded in negligence ° or in strict liability.5 1 This "third party intervenor" defense prevented plaintiffs
from imposing liability on defendants for polluting acts caused
solely by third parties. 52
In summary, the 1970 pollution exclusion was not meant to exclude coverage for liability imposed on policyholders for the polluting acts of third parties because, in 1970, when the exclusion was
drafted, liability was not imposed on policyholders for the polluting acts of third parties. The 1970 pollution exclusion simply does
not apply to defeat coverage for defendant-policyholders who did
not proximately cause the polluting discharges. We shall refer to
these defendant-policyholders as "uninvolved liable parties." 53
B.

The 1970 Pollution Exclusion Is Ambiguous with Respect to
What Constitutes an Accidental Discharge of Pollutants

The above discussion demonstrates that the 1970 pollution exclusion does not apply to an uninvolved liable party. The converse
is that the exclusion does apply to defeat coverage in situations
where the policyholder proximately caused the polluting discharge.
The question then becomes whether the policyholder's polluting
activities come within the terms of the limitation on the scope of
the exclusion; that is, whether the "discharge, dispersal, release or
escape [was] sudden and accidental" 54 ("the exclusion limitation").
When a court is interpreting the exclusion limitation, therefore, it
should always have before it a policyholder who has proximately
caused the pollution for which it is potentially being held liable.
In this context, it makes sense first to determine whether the
policyholder's discharge of pollutants was accidental. If the exclusion limitation only applies when the discharge is both sudden and
accidental, then a determination as to whether the policyholder's
50. Anderson v. Jones, 213 N.E.2d 627, 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (holding the defendant not liable because a third party's negligence caused the injury).
51. Santiago v. Package Mach. Co., 260 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (finding that
the defendant manufacturer could avoid all liability by proving another was the sole
proximate cause).
52. See Afran Transp. Co. v. United States, 435 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 872 (1971); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. McDowell, 413 P.2d 749 (Ariz. 1966);
Pickens v. Harrison, 252 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1952).
53. Uninvolved liable parties can now be held liable for the polluting acts of third
parties because of the advent of modem environmental statutes such as CERCLA. Such
statutes, none of which were in effect prior to 1970, impose "absolute" liability; that is,
liability that is not only strict but which also removes traditional requirements of proximate causation. CERCLA was not passed until 1980.
54. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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discharge of pollutants was intentional potentially ends the
inquiry. 5
Determining whether the policyholder's discharge of pollutants
was an accidental discharge presents an especially difficult policy
construction matter because both the terms "accidental" and "discharge" are ambiguous. "Accidental" is ambiguous because the
exclusion does not specify whether the discharge must be accidental from the policyholder's, or from someone else's, point of view.
"Discharge" is ambiguous because it could refer either to any discharge of pollutants by the policyholder or only to discharges that
result in damage or injury.
1. Whether a Discharge Is Accidental Must Be Determined
from the Policyholder's Point of View
If otherwise undefined in the policy, the term "accidental" as
used in the 1970 pollution exclusion is ambiguous because the policy does not specify from whose point of view the discharge must
be accidental. The policy merely states that the exclusion does not
apply if the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and
accidental."
This ambiguity could render the pollution exclusion wholly ineffective. If, for example, the limitation is construed to mean that
there is coverage whenever a discharge of pollutants is accidental
from anyone's point of view, then even when the policyholder intentionally discharges pollutants, the discharge obstensibly could
be considered accidental from the point of view of the injured or
damaged party.
Courts have long held that the term "accidental" in an insurance
policy, if undefined, is ambiguous as to point of view.5 6 For example, the Supreme Court of Washington in FederatedAmerican In55. This same reasoning would, of course, apply to a determination of whether the
discharge of pollutants was sudden. However, the decision to analyze "accidental" first is
not arbitrary. As will be discussed later, the determination of whether a discharge is
sudden turns on the expectations of the policyholder, whereas the determination of
whether a discharge is accidental depends on the policyholder's intent. The former inquiry is thus the more difficult one because it involves determining whether there was a
substantial probability from the policyholder's point of view that the polluting discharges
were occurring. The latter inquiry is simpler because it only involves determining
whether the policyholder specifically desired to cause the polluting discharges, or alternatively, whether the policyholder specifically knew that the discharges were occurring and
did nothing to stop them. Since the latter inquiry is easier and potentially dispositive, it
makes sense to conduct it first.
56. Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Strong, 689 P.2d 68, 74 (Wash. 1984) (granting coverage for damage to husband's car where wife had intentionally caused the damage); see
also Freeman v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 271 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971);
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surance Co. v. Strong recognized that: "As used'in [the insurance
company's] policy, the term 'accidental' is ambiguous, since the
policy does not specify from whose standpoint the presence or lack
of intent is to be assessed.""7 For that reason, the court construed
the ambiguity against the insurance company.5
With respect to the standard-form CGL policy, some courts
have determined that the term "accidental" as employed in the
1970 pollution exclusion is further defined by the definition of "occurrence."59 The standard-form comprehensive liability policy defines' "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."'
In International Minerals and Chemical
Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,61 the court construed the
above terms to determine that an accidental discharge must be
viewed from the policyholder's perspective. The International
Minerals court reasoned as follows:
Considering first whether the events here constituted an "accidental" event, we return to the "occurrence" definition where the
term accident is first used in the policy. That definition speaks of
an accident in terms of the intentions and expectations of the insured. Thus, we interpret the exception to provide that if the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants is unintended
and unexpected from the standpointof the insured, it has met one
of the two prerequisites for reinstatement of coverage.62
Therefore, in a standard-form liability policy, courts must determine whether the discharge is accidental from the point of view of
the policyholder.
2.

The Phrase "Discharge, Dispersal, Release or Escape"
Is Ambiguous

The task of deciding whether a particular discharge of pollutants
is an accidental discharge is made difficult not only by the ambiguity of the term "accidental" but also by the ambiguity of the phrase
Pleasant v. Motors Ins. Co., 185 S.E.2d 164 (N.C. 1971); Bone v. Charlotte Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 179 S.E.2d 171 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
57. FederatedAm. Ins., 689 P.2d at 74.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522
N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 246 (Ili. 1988).
60. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
61. International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758
(I11. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 246 (I11. 1988).
62. Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
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"the discharge, dispersal, release or escape." One reasonable interpretation of the phrase "the discharge, . . . or escape" is that it

refers to any activity involving the discharge of pollutants: "This
insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of [any activity involving] the discharge, dispersal, release
or escape of [pollutants]." Under this interpretation, all discharges
of pollutants made by the policyholder would defeat coverage, regardless of whether the policyholder's activity consisted of harmless discharges as well as damage-causing discharges. For
example, if an exterminator lawfully discharged pesticides and unintentionally discharged some of those pesticides to a part of the
customer's house causing damage or injury, there would be no coverage under this interpretation because the policyholder was intentionally discharging pollutants.
Another reasonable interpretation of the phrase "the discharge,
*

. escape" is that it refers only to the particular discharges of

pollutants that result in injury or damage: "This insurance does
not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
[damage-causing] discharge, dispersal, release or escape of [pollutants]." Under this interpretation, the discharge at issue would
only include those particular discharges made by the policyholder
that resulted in injury or damage and would not include harmless
discharges of pollutants.
Under this second interpretation, the exterminator example
comes out differently. If an exterminator lawfully discharged pesticides and unintentionally discharged some of those pesticides to a
part of the customer's house where they caused damage or injury,
this time there would be coverage because the policyholder did not
intend to make the particular discharges that resulted in the injury
or damage.
The ambiguity of the phrase "the discharge,

. . .

escape" is thus

demonstrated by the above example. Where a policyholder permits both harmless and damage-causing discharges of pollutants
and intends the harmless discharges, but not the damage-causing
discharges, cases involving identical facts come out differently depending on which of the two available interpretations of "the dis63
charge, . . . escape" the court employs.

Again, as with the "accident" ambiguity, following the guiding
principles of construction, courts should construe this discharge
ambiguity in favor of coverage. Specifically, the ambiguity should
63.

See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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be resolved in favor of the relevant discharges being the damagecausing discharges. This narrower construction restricts the
number of situations in which the pollution exclusion bars coverage. Moreover, the Maryland Appellate Court, in addressing the
exterminator fact situation, construed the ambiguity of the phrase
"the discharge, . . . escape" to mean only the damage-causing

discharges. 64
Two Illinois cases, Reliance Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Martin6
and Barmet of Indiana v. Security Insurance Group,66 illustrate the
care required when navigating this particular ambiguity. These
cases have nearly identical fact situations.
In Reliance, the policyholder operated a parking garage.67 In
the underlying action, the plaintiffs alleged that, over a period of
time, carbon monoxide and black soot regularly escaped from the
garage and entered their nearby condominium unit. 6 The policyholder's insurer refused to defend and indemnify, arguing that the
policyholder knew that pollutants generally escaped from its garage and that the policyholder therefore intended the discharges.69
The Reliance court nevertheless rejected the insurer's contention
and construed the ambiguity of the phrase "the discharge,

. . .

es-

cape" in favor of coverage.7" The court stated that while the parking garage operator "must expect to release fumes and soot into the
facility itself, as well as into the air and streets, it is not equally
clear that he should expect to release soot and fumes into adjacent
residential structures."71 The court held that this was a question of
fact.7 2 The Reliance court resolved the ambiguity by holding that
the relevant discharges were the damage-causing discharges.
In Barmet, the policyholder operated an aluminum recycling
plant.73 Although the plant had an air pollution control system,
clouds of gases frequently escaped into the atmosphere without be64. Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 575 A.2d 795, 803 (Md. 1990)
("To the extent that toxic chemicals thus landed where they were not supposed to land,
the discharge was both accidental and sudden. It was accidental in that it was unintended ...."). But see Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. City of Woodhaven, No.
85180, 1991 Mich LEXIS 1812 (Mich. Aug. 26, 1991).
65. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Martin, 467 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
66. Barmet of Ind. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
67. Reliance, 467 N.E.2d at 288.

68.

Id.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 289.
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
Barmet of Ind. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
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ing filtered.74 These gases would travel some two or three miles
and obscure visibility on the nearby highway. 75 The policyholder
was sued when a driver was killed in an automobile accident proximately caused by the policyholder's visibility-reducing gases.76
As in Reliance, the insurer in Barmet argued that the policyholder knew that its plant emitted gases and thus that its discharges were intended. 7 The Barmet court construed the
ambiguity of the phrase "the discharge,

. .

escape" the same way

as the Reliance court. The Barmet court, however, .denied coverage because it found, as a factual matter, that the policyholder did
indeed intend the injury-causing discharges because it knew that its
gases were being discharged onto the highway.78
The difference between Reliance and Barmet is one of fact, not
one of law. The Reliance court could not affirm a summary judgment based upon a finding of fact that the damage-causing emissions were intended because it believed that there was conflicting
evidence or inferences with respect to a material issue of fact.79
The Reliance court, therefore, remanded the case for a trial with
respect to whether the policyholder knew that its emissions would
enter the condominium. 0
In contrast, the Barmet court reviewed the record of a full trial
on the merits.8 ' Factual findings were made at trial that Barmet
knew the injury-causing emissions were occurring. 82 Hence, the
Barmet court affirmed the trial court's denial of coverage.83 The
correct resolution of the ambiguity of the phrase "the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape" is, therefore, that it refers to only dam74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 203. The Bannet court stated:
Barmet argues that they had no knowledge that the emissions would travel two
or three miles from their plant. The facts do not support Barmet's argument
that the emissions were unforeseeable or unpredictable because Barmet had
been emitting gases regularly and frequently since beginning its operations.
Although Barmet may not have intended for the emissions to obstruct the visibility and thus, perhaps, contribute to the accident, this problem was certainly
foreseeable because Barmet had received numerous complaints regarding their
emissions.
Id.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Reliance, 467 N.E.2d at 290.
Id.
Barmet, 425 N.E.2d at 202.
Id. at 203.
Id.
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age-causing discharges, not to any activity involving a combination
of harmless as well as damage-causing discharges.
In short, to determine whether there has been an accidental discharge of pollutants, a court should determine whether the damage-causing discharges were accidental from the policyholder's
point of view. If the defendant-policyholder does not meet this
test, in other words, if the damage-causing discharges were not accidental from the policyholder's viewpoint, then the policyholder is
what we shall hereinafter refer to as an "intentional polluter."
However, if the damage-causing discharges were accidental, then
the defendant-policyholder meets this test and shall be referred to
as an "unintentional polluter."
C. The 1970 Pollution Exclusion Is Ambiguous with Respect to
What Constitutes a Sudden Dischargeof Pollutants
Once a court establishes that a policyholder proximately caused
a discharge of pollutants, and that the discharge was accidental,
the final step of the analysis is to determine whether the discharge
was "sudden." The starting point for this inquiry, however, is the
darkest recess of the 1970 pollution exclusion labyrinth. The analysis of whether there has been a sudden discharge is complicated
because the term "sudden" is ambiguous both as to its substantive
meaning and as to its point of view. By far, this area of inquiry has
generated the most confusion in the courts.
1. The Term "Sudden" Is Ambiguous with Respect to Whether
it Means Unexpected or Temporally Quick
The term "sudden" is not defined in standard-form CGL insurance policies. An undefined term in an insurance policy is to be
understood in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.84 Consequently, courts often look to standard non-legal dictionaries for
guidance as to the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of otherwise undefined insurance policy terms."5
The reasonable substantive meanings of the term "sudden,"
therefore, can be determined by reference to a standard dictionary.
Webster's dictionary defines "sudden" as: (1) "happening without
previous notice or with very brief notice; coming or occurring un84. Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 104
N.E.2d 250, 254 (I11.
1952).
85. See id. at 254; United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.v. Specialty Coatings Co.of Ill.,
535 N.E.2d 1071, 1080 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 133 (I11.
1989); Marsh
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 388 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (I11.
App. Ct. 1979).
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expectedly; not foreseen or prepared for"; (2) "characterized by or
manifesting hastiness."'8 6 The first entry defines the term "sudden"
essentially as unexpected, and the second entry defines it with reference to temporal quickness. Clearly, "sudden" has two distinct,
reasonable meanings. Moreover, several state courts of last resort
have found guidance from dictionaries as to the substantive meaning of the term "sudden."8 " For example, the Supreme Court of
Georgia recognized both distinct reasonable meanings of the term
"sudden" as defined in the above dictionary. 8 Because standard
dictionaries define the term "sudden" as: (1) unexpected; and (2)
temporally quick; the term "sudden" is ambiguous in the pollution
exclusion as between these two reasonable meanings.8 9
If the term "sudden" is given the meaning of unexpected, there
is still ambiguity as to whether the discharge must be unexpected
from the policyholder's point of view, or from someone else's point
of view. There is no definition of the term "sudden" elsewhere in
the policy to help resolve this ambiguity. Thus, the same analysis
of the ambiguity of the phrase "the discharge .... escape," which

was discussed in the previous section," applies in determining
whether a sudden discharge has occurred.
Alternatively, if a court determines the term "sudden" means
temporally quick, there remains further ambiguity as to whether
the term "sudden" refers to an absolute measure of time, such as
"instantaneous" or "one second," or whether it is a relative measure of time. If the term "sudden" refers to a relative measure of
time, then its ambiguity with respect to point of view arises because
the same event might be described as sudden from one point of
view and yet gradual from another.
Additionally, if the temporal meaning of the term "sudden" is
86. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2284 (1981).
87. Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989); see also
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1091 (Colo. 1991) ("When
determining the plain and ordinary meaning of words, definitions in a recognized dictionary may be considered. In doing so, we find that a number of recognized dictionaries
differ on the meaning of the term 'sudden.' ") (citation omitted); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Wis. 1990) ("The very fact that recognized dictionaries
differ on the primary definition of 'sudden' is evidence in and of itself that the term is
ambiguous.").
88. Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688. In addition, the Claussen court observed: "The
definition of the word 'sudden' as 'abrupt' is also recognized in several dictionaries and is
common in the vernacular." Id.
89. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., Nos. 70029, 70030,
70032, 70036, 1991 WL 80942 (Ill. May 20, 1991); see infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
90. See supra part 111.B.1.
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chosen, a new ambiguity of the phrase "the discharge,

. . .

escape"

enters the analysis. Many fact situations involve a number of discrete discharges which take place over a period of time. An example is a pollution control device that periodically, but
unexpectedly, malfunctions. The determination of whether "the
discharge,.. . escape" is temporally sudden can be based on either
of two questions: (1) whether the entire set of discharges happened
quickly; or (2) whether each discrete discharge happened quickly.
With so many wrong turns to take, it is not surprising that
courts have had trouble arriving at a consistent analysis regarding
whether a sudden discharge has occurred. Again, the confusion is
caused because some courts have failed to recognize the ambiguities and therefore have chosen coverage-defeating interpretations.9
The Supreme Court of Georgia stated that the word "sudden"
often occurs in everyday life with its sole meaning being its sense of
unexpected, without any temporal connotation. 92 The court recognized that "sudden" often describes the unexpectedness of an event
and gave examples of this popular usage including "a sudden
storm, a sudden turn in the road, sudden death." 93 The court further quoted dictionary examples of usage that dated back to 1340
including: "She heard a sudden step behind her"; and, "A sudden
'94
little river crossed my path as unexpected as a serpent comes.
In addition, looking beyond the dictionary, one can imagine numerous examples where the term "sudden" is properly used in a
sentence to mean solely "unexpected," without any temporal
connotation:
She walked slowly toward the sudden bend in the road.
The tree was perfect except for the sudden knot near the top.
The sudden rise in slope made our hike difficult.
The bricks in the wall showed a sudden change in color between
the third floor and the fourth floor.
The green carpet of grass was interrupted by the sudden patches
of yellow dandelions.
While walking on the plateau, we came to a sudden drop.

Max stopped reading the book after the sudden twist in the plot.
Unexpected is clearly a reasonable meaning of the word "sudden."
The reasonable meaning of the term "sudden" as unexpected
generally has not been disputed. In Illinois, for example, there are
five appellate court cases construing the term "sudden" in the con91.

See infra note 110 and accompanying text.

92.
93.
94.

Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688.
Id.
Id. (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 96 (1933)).
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text of the 1970 pollution exclusion.95 All agree that "sudden" can
reasonably mean unexpected, but two of the five cases have found
that "sudden" means temporally quick.9 6 The other three cases,
Wilkin,97 Reliance,9 and Specialty Coatings,99 have found the term
"sudden" to mean unexpected in the context of the 1970 pollution
exclusion.
In Reliance, the court first considered the term "sudden" in the
context of the 1970 pollution exclusion.'" The damage-causing
discharges of carbon monoxide and soot were alleged to have occurred regularly over a period of time. 10 1 The Reliance court
found that the substantive meaning of the term "sudden" was ambiguous and held that "the relevant question is not the time frame
involved but whether ...

the insured could have intended or ex-

pected carbon monoxide and soot to enter the [plaintiff's] condo02
'
minium unit."'

Similarly, in Specialty Coatings, the court considered whether
the long-continued polluting acts of third persons could be considered "sudden."' 0 3 In reaching its decision, the Specialty Coatings
court reviewed, inter alia, documentation of the drafting history of
the 1970 pollution exclusion, including representations made by
the insurance industry to state insurance commissioners. 1°4 Based
on its review of this material, the court noted that before the insurance industry added the pollution exclusion, occurrence-based coverage embraced exposure to conditions continuing over an
unmeasured time period. 01 5 Further, members of the insurance in95. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.E.2d 1154, 1162-63 (Ill.
App. Ct.), appealgranted, 575 N.E.2d 917 (Ill. 1991); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 550 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), aff'd on other
grounds, 578 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1991); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty
Coatings Co. of Ill., 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1076-77 (Ill. App. Ct.) appealdenied, 545 N.E.2d
133 (Ill. 1989); International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522
N.E.2d 758, 767-69 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1988); Reliance
Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Martin, 467 N.E.2d 287, 290 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984).
96. OutboardMarine, 570 N.E.2d at 1163; InternationalMinerals, 522 N.E.2d at 769.
97. Wilkin, 550 N.E.2d at 1039.
98. Reliance, 467 N.E.2d at 290.
99. Specialty Coatings, 467 N.E.2d at 1077.
100. Reliance, 467 N.E.2d at 290.
101. Id. at 288; see supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
102. Reliance, 467 N.E.2d at 290.
103. Specialty Coatings, 535 N.E.2d at 1077-78.
104. Id. at 1077.
105. Id. The Speciality Coatings court noted:
The expressed intent underpinning the insertion of the pollution exclusion
clause was submitted for approval to various state insurance commissioners by
representatives of the insurance industry, such as the Mutual Insurance Rating

1991]

The 1970 Pollution Exclusion

dustry, upon submitting the pollution exclusion .to state commissioners, explained that the pollution exclusion was intended to
clarify that "the definition of occurrence excludes damages that
' °6 Consequently, the Specan be said to be expected or intended."
cialty Coatings court concluded that any ambiguities must be construed against the insurer given the alleged facts, the policy
language, and its drafting history described above.107
The Illinois Appellate Court reaffirmed the reasoning of Specialty Coatings in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co. 10 Wilkin involved a coverage suit in which the
underlying complaint alleged property damage because of the
gradual release of asbestos fibers."
The two Illinois decisions that found "sudden" to mean temporally quick, InternationalMinerals and Chemical Corp. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. and OutboardMarine v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., admit that "sudden" can reasonably mean both unexpected and temporally quick.°10 These decisions do not deny that
the term "sudden" often means unexpected, but rather, rest their
result on a rule of contract construction. The court in Outboard
Marine relied on the presumption that a contract's words are never
intended to be meaningless, and therefore, interpretations rendering contractual words "mere surplusage" are improper."I SpecifiBureau ("MIRB"), an association serving the insurance industry. For example,
MIRB, which assisted in the draft of the exclusion endorsement, in a submission to the West Virginia Commissioner of Insurance, explained that the intent
of the clause was to clarify "that the definition of occurrence excludes damages
that can be said to be expected or intended."
We are persuaded that, under the facts alleged in the underlying actions, the
policy language, and the historical background of the exclusionary clause, the
ambiguities [of the word "sudden"] identified by defendants must be construed
against [the insurer].
Id. at 1077-78.
106. Id. at 1077.
107. Id. at 1078.
108. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 550 N.E.2d 1032,
1039-40 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
109. Id. at 1036.
110. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.E.2d 1154, 1163 (Ill.
App. Ct.), appeal granted, 575 N.E.2d 917 (Ill. 1991); International Minerals & Chem.
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758, 769 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 530
N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 1988) ("[W]e decline to ignore these temporal-focused definitions or hold
)
that, because the word might also have other contextual uses, it is ambiguous.
(emphasis added).
11. Outboard Marine, 570 N.E.2d at 1163. The court stated:
It is presumed that words and phrases inserted into contracts were not intended to be meaningless; therefore, an interpretation which renders a contrac-

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 23

cally, the court said that when interpreting the pollution exclusion,
if the word "sudden" is found to mean unintended or unexpected,
then it becomes useless surplusage because it is synonymous with
the word "accidental." ' 1 2 The court, therefore, avoided this excess
l3
by construing the term "sudden" to mean temporally quick.'
This "surplusage" argument, however, is flawed for a number of
reasons. First, the "surplusage" argument is result-oriented. All
of the Illinois courts that have considered the question agree that
the term "sudden" can mean both unexpected and temporally
quick. 14 While the courts in Reliance, Specialty Coatings, and
Wilkin followed the guiding principles of insurance policy construction and interpreted that ambiguity in favor of coverage, the
courts in InternationalMinerals and Outboard Marine followed a
general rule of contract construction and interpreted the ambiguity
against finding coverage." 5 Neither the International Minerals
court nor the OutboardMarine court gave any reason for choosing
a general "surplusage" rule of contract construction over a rule
crafted specifically for interpreting insurance policies.
In fact, there is reason to reject the "surplusage" rule of construction in the context of interpreting insurance policies because
insurance policies often combine several words of similar meaning
to communicate a single concept. This point was recognized by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in addressing an argument identical to the surplusage argument found
tual word or phrase mere surplusage should be avoided if possible. As the court
pointed out in InternationalMinerals, if the term "sudden" is interpreted as
meaning "unintended and unexpected," it becomes synonymous with the word
"accidental," making one of the words nothing more than redundant surplusage. According to OMC, the word "sudden" means unexpected and "accidental" means unintended; therefore, the two words as employed in the pollution
exclusion clause are not redundant surplusage if "sudden" does not include a
temporal element. We agree, however, with those authorities that define "accidental" as meaning unintended and unexpected. If a party expects an event to
occur, the event cannot reasonably be considered accidental with reference to
that party. Therefore, if "sudden" is construed as meaning unexpected and
having no temporal connotation, the word is reduced to mere surplusage.
Id. (citations omitted).
112. Id.; see InternationalMinerals, 522 N.E.2d at 769.
113. Outboard Marine, 570 N.E.2d at 1163; see InternationalMinerals,522 N.E.2d at
769.
114. Outboard Marine, 570 N.E.2d at 1162; United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Wilkin Insulation Co., 550 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co. of Ill., 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1077-78 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989); InternationalMinerals, 522 N.E.2d at 768; Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Martin, 467
N.E.2d 287, 290 (11. App. Ct. 1984).
115. InternationalMinerals, 522 N.E.2d at 769; Outboard Marine, 570 N.E.2d at
1163.
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in InternationalMinerals and Outboard Marine."6 In New Castle
County v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., the Third Circuit
refuted the "surplusage" argument by recognizing that insurance
policies often use words that are "somewhat synonymous."' 7 Specifically, the court noted that the exception to the pollution exclusion clause uses the words "discharge, dispersal, release or escape,"
which each generally mean "fortuity," with little variation."'
Therefore, the court stated that it would be ridiculous to conclude
that "annexing the word 'sudden' to the word 'accidental' with the
conjunctive 'and' necessarily injects a temporal element, such as
brevity or abruptness, into the exception to the pollution exclusion
clause." ' 19 Hence, the surplusage rule has little or no value in the
context of interpreting insurance policies, and, in any event, it
should not take precedence over the guiding principle that ambiguities in an insurance policy should be interpreted in favor of
coverage.
Even if the "surplusage" rule were the correct rule of construction, the premise of the argument in this context is incorrect. The
premise of the "surplusage" argument is that "accidental" always
means both unintended and unexpected. This proposition, however, cannot be true. The entire area of negligence law was created
to assign responsibility for accidental events that were foreseeable
116. New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1194-95
(3d Cir. 1991). The court observed:
Because the word "accidental" already encompasses notions of unexpectedness, CNA contends that the district court, in interpreting "sudden" also to
mean "unexpected," failed to appreciate the significance of the conjunctive in
the phrase "sudden and accidental." In so doing, CNA asserts, the district
court violated the basic principle of insurance law that all words in a policy
should be given effect. ...
We believe that the word "sudden," even if defined to mean "unexpected," is
not completely synonymous with the word "accidental." Simply put, sudden
means unexpected and accidental means unintended. To the extent that the
meanings of these words overlap, we do not think that this precluded the district court from defining sudden as unexpected. Insurance policies routinely use
words that, while not strictly redundant, are somewhat synonymous. For example, the exception to the pollution exclusion clause also uses the words "discharge, dispersal, release or escape": ... they each connote the same general
concept - namely, fortuity - with small variation. Neither do we think that
annexing the word "sudden" to the word "accidental" with the conjunctive
"and" necessarily injects a temporal element, such as brevity or abruptness, into
the exception to the pollution exclusion clause.
Id.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1194.
Id.
Id. at 1194-95.
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or expected. Just because an accidental happening is determined to
have been foreseeable, and hence preventable, does not mean that it
cannot be an accident.
Moreover, there are numerous examples of the term "accidental" properly used solely to mean unintended:
Every time he stepped into his race car, the driver rubbed his
lucky rabbit's foot, hoping that he would avoid any accidental
pile-ups.
Even though football players wear a great deal of safety equipment, they are fully aware that they will still have accidental
injuries.
No pollution control system is perfect; there will always be some
accidental discharges of pollutants into the environment.
In each of these instances, while the damage-causing or injurycausing event is not intended, it is nevertheless foreseen or expected. Thus, "accidental" is often used to refer only to the unintentional aspect of an event, and that event may be either expected
or unexpected from the point of view of the party who physically
causes the accident.
Adding the term "sudden," in its sense of unexpected, to the
term "accidental" clarifies that, for the limitation of the 1970 pollution exclusion to apply, a damage-causing discharge must be
both unintended and unexpected. Construing the term "sudden"
in its admitted sense of unexpected adds an important qualification
to the applicability of the pollution exclusion and therefore does
not result in surplusage.
Finally, the InternationalMinerals and Outboard Marine decisions failed to recognize that construing the term "sudden" in its
sense of temporally quick creates an absurdity in the pollution exclusion. The Supreme Court of Colorado recently recognized this
problem. 2 ' The absurdity results because, as noted above, the
term "accidental" is further defined by the definition of the term
120. Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo.
1991). The Hecla court noted:
If we were to construe "sudden and accidental" to have a solely temporal
connotation, the result would be inconsistent definitions within the CGL policies. In the portion of the policies defining occurrence, accident is defined to
include "continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which result in bodily
injury or property damage, neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." If "sudden" were to be given a temporal connotation of abrupt
or immediate, then the phrase "sudden and accidental discharge" would mean:
an abrupt or immediate, and continuous or repeated discharge. The phrase
"sudden and accidental" thus becomes inherently contradictory and
meaningless.
Id. (citations omitted).
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"occurrence."121 In the definition of "occurrence," the concept of

an accidental event specifically includes "continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions."' 22 The term "accidental," therefore, is
defined to include gradual events. If, however, the term "sudden"
is construed to mean temporally quick, in cases involving continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, the limitation to the pollution exclusion will be defined to apply when "the discharge,
23
escape" is temporally quick and gradual-an absurdity.
Far from being surplusage, an interpretation of the term "sudden" in its sense of unexpected actually saves the pollution exclu' 24
sion from being "inherently contradictory and meaningless."'
With respect to its substantive ambiguity, the term "sudden,"
therefore, should be construed to refer to the unexpectedness of a
discharge, dispersal, release or escape.
2.

Whether a Discharge Is Sudden Must be Determined from
the Policyholder's Point of View

As with "accidental," the limitation to the 1970 pollution exclusion does not specify from whose point of view "the discharge,...
escape" is to be considered sudden or not sudden. 25 Hence, to
determine whether a sudden discharge has occurred, it is necessary
to decide whether the suddenness of a discharge is to be determined from the policyholder's point of view or from someone else's
point of view.
The term "sudden" is not defined in standard CGL policies.
Thus, under the guiding principle of construction, this ambiguity
should be construed in favor of coverage.
The coverage-favoring construction is that the suddenness, or
unexpectedness, of a discharge should be determined from the
point of view of the policyholder. This construction favors coverage because if the suddenness of the discharge is determined from
someone else's point of view, it is more likely that a discharge will
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also City of Northglenn v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217, 222
(D. Colo. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 203-04,
(W.D. Mo. 1986); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 664 P.2d 1262,
1265-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
125. Having construed "sudden" in its sense of unexpected, there is no need to consider whether in its temporal sense "sudden" should be construed as an absolute measure
of time (needing no point of view) or a relative measure of time. Nor is there the need to
consider the host of other ambiguities, noted above, that are raised when "sudden" is
construed in its temporal sense.
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be considered not sudden.' 26 As a consequence, coverage will be
blocked in a greater number of circumstances. Thus, whether "a
discharge, dispersal, release or escape" is sudden should be determined from the viewpoint of the policyholder.
3.

The Phrase "Discharge, Dispersal, Release or Escape"
Is Ambiguous
When interpreting whether a discharge was sudden, it is important to recognize that the phrase "the discharge, dispersal, release
or escape" is ambiguous. This ambiguity is the same one discussed
above in connection with interpreting the term "accidental";
namely, that the phrase "the discharge, .. . escape" can either refer
to: (1) any activity1 involving
discharges; or (2) particular damage27
causing discharges.
As before, this ambiguity should be construed in favor of coverage. That is, the question should be whether the particular damage-causing discharges of pollutants were expected from the point
of view of the policyholder, not whether any discharges of pollutants were expected from the point of view of the policyholder.
4.

The Term "Sudden" Is Ambiguous as to How Probable the
Discharge Must Be to Be Considered Not Sudden
Since the suddenness of a discharge depends on the expectations
of the insured, the question arises as to how probable a discharge
must be to be considered expected, as opposed to sudden. One possibility is that a discharge should be considered expected when it is
"foreseeable," and hence preventable. Tort law imposes this level
of probability on careless or "negligent" defendants. This is an objective test and does not take into account what the policyholder
actually knew, only what it should have known.
Another possibility is that a discharge should be considered expected when there is a "substantial probability" from the policyholder's point of view that the discharge will happen and yet the
policyholder nevertheless fails to prevent it. Tort law imposes this
level of probability on "reckless" defendants. This test is subjective
and depends on what the policyholder actually knew with respect
to the probability of the occurrence of the discharge.
Once again, under the guiding principle of construction, this ambiguity should be construed in favor of coverage. Thus, the "sub126.
1990).
127.

See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 754 F. Supp. 1576, 1582 (S.D. Ga.
See supra part III.B.2.
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stantial probability" test should be used rather than the
"foreseeability" test because discharges will be foreseeable more
often than they will be substantially probable. 28 Consequently, to
determine whether there has been a sudden discharge of pollutants,
a court should determine whether the defendant-policyholder believed it was substantially probable that the damage-causing discharges would occur.
IV.

PROPOSAL

A. Once the Numerous Ambiguities of the 1970 Pollution
Exclusion Are Correctly Resolved, Clear Rules Emerge to
Determine Whether Coverage Should Be Granted
Combining the conclusions from the above analysis, we propose
that the relevant inquiry for determining the applicability of the
1970 pollution exclusion should be as summarized below. This
method will avoid the confusion that is apparent in many court
decisions.
First, a court should determine whether the policyholder proximately caused the discharges of pollution for which it is being held
liable. If the policyholder did not cause the discharges, it is an
"uninvolved liable party"' 29 and the pollution exclusion does not
apply. However, if the policyholder did proximately cause the discharges of pollutants, the exclusion applies and the limitation to
the exclusion then must be analyzed.
Second, in situations where the policyholder proximately caused
the discharges of pollutants, the court first should determine
whether the damage-causing discharges were intended from the
policyholder's point of view. If the policyholder did intend the
damage-causing discharges, it is an "intentional polluter,"' 130 and
such discharges cannot be considered accidental discharges. In
these instances, the exclusion thus defeats coverage because the exclusion limitation does not apply.
Third, if the policyholder did not intend the damage-causing discharges, it is an "unintentional polluter," 3 ' and it is then necessary
128. This conclusion is further supported by the analysis of the identical question by
courts concerning the "expected or intended" phrase in the definition of "occurrence."
See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164 (Ala. 1985); James
Graham Brown Found., Inc. v.St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 90-SC-242-DG,
1991 WL 117506 (Ky.1991).
129. See infra part IV.B.1.
130. See infra part IV.B.2.
131. See infra part IV.B.3.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 23

to determine whether the discharges were sudden discharges. If it
is determined that the discharges were not sudden, then coverage
will be defeated. However, if it is decided that the discharges were
sudden, then the policyholder is entitled to coverage.
To determine whether a discharge is sudden, the court should
decide whether the damage-causing discharges were expected (in
the sense of substantially probable to occur) from the policyholder's point of view. If the policyholder did not expect the damage-causing discharges to occur, the exclusion limitation applies
and the exclusion does not defeat coverage. If the policyholder did
expect the damage-causing discharges to occur, the exclusion limitation does not apply and the exclusion defeats coverage.
B.

The Results of Reported State Court Decisions Are Consistent
with the Above-Described Analysis

The results of reported state court decisions support the analysis
described above.' 32 Although the reasoning of the various courts
strongly conflict, the remarkably consistent results from these decisions indicate the accuracy of our proposed analysis as outlined
above.
1. Uninvolved Liable Parties
These cases all involve policyholders who did not proximately
cause the polluting discharges. Several involve a policyholder who
merely delivered its waste to a third party. In each of these cases,
the third party then caused the polluting. discharges. 33 The re132. Notes 133, 134, 137, and 139-44 contain factual summaries of reported state
cases that address the application of the pollution exclusion. Cases that do not explicitly
analyze the application of the pollution exclusion to a particular set of facts are not included. Thus, Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568
(Mass. 1990), is not included because that case was decided without any facts before the
court.
133. In United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co. of Ill., 535
N.E.2d 1071, 1079 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 133 (I11. 1989), the policyholder contracted with a waste hauling company to pick up waste at the policyholder's
facility and properly dispose of the waste. The waste hauler did not properly dispose of
the policyholder's waste, but instead dumped the waste openly on its own property, creating the environmental hazard for which the policyholder was held responsible Id. at
1073. There were no allegations that the policyholder had knowledge of the illegal dumping by the waste hauler. Id.
In Du-Wel Prod., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 1113, 1115 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989), appealdenied, 583 A.2d 316 (N.J. 1990), the policyholder generated
toxic sludge as a by-product of its electroplating process, and contracted with an independent state-licensed waste hauler to dispose of the sludge at a disposal site approved
by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources. The policyholder was sued when the
independent waste hauler improperly maintained the landfill and caused the pollution.
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maining cases in this grouping are logically similar in that, for one
reason or another, the policyholder was not involved with the activity resulting in the discharges. 1 34 Of the twelve cases falling
Id. at 1118. 'The policyholder had complied with all of the applicabhl regulations, and did
not expect or intend that its wastes would be improperly discharged. Id. at 1117, 1119.
In CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 489 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 495 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), the
policyholder contracted with an independent waste hauling company for the proper removal and disposal of waste generated at its premises. The City of Philadelphia sued the
policyholder for environmental damage caused when the waste hauler illegally deposited
the waste at the city dump site. Id. The policyholder had no knowledge of the improper
actions of the waste disposal company. Id.
In Kipin Indus., Inc. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 535 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987), the policyholder was engaged in the business of removing chemicals from
barges. The policyholder contracted with a waste hauling company to dispose of the
waste waters generated from the barge clean-ups, but the waste hauling company improperly disposed of the waste. Id.
In Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1229
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984), the policyholders generated hazardous wastes in the course of their
business. They contracted with the owner and operator of a hazardous waste site to
dispose of their waste, but this operator did so improperly. Id. There were no allegations
in the underlying complaint that the policyholders expected or intended the releases by
the waste disposal company. Id.
134. In Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 687 (Ga. 1989), the
policyholder leased a site to the City of Jacksonville. The city dumped hazardous wastes
at the site and the policyholder was later held responsible for the clean-up of the site. Id.
The city had dumped the wastes at the site without the knowledge of the policyholder,
and then returned the site to the policyholder completely filled, graded, and seeded. Id.
In Thompson v. Temple, 580 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (La. Ct. App. 1991), the policyholder
rented a house to the plaintiffs. A heater in the house leaked carbon monoxide and injured the inhabitants of the house. Id. The policyholder did not have any knowledge of
the leak. Id.
In Summit Assoc., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 1235, 1236 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1988), the policyholder bought real estate which the previous owner had used to
dispose of hazardous wastes. When the policyholder began to develop the newly acquired
piece of real estate, it uncovered a large, underground sludge pit, and was subsequently
held responsible for its clean-up. Id. at 1237. The policyholder had developed land
surrounding the site without encountering any underground sewer structures, and had no
knowledge of the previous owner's disposal activities. Id. at 1238.
In Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 350 A.2d 520, 521 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1975), aff'd, 368 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), appeal denied, 372 A.2d 322
(N.J. 1977), the policyholder maintained tanks for the storage of asphaltic oil on a parcel
of land which it leased. Sometime during the night, third parties (suspected vandals)
entered the land without the policyholder's permission or knowledge and opened the
valves on the storage tanks. Id. Fourteen thousand gallons of oil leaked onto the property and into a river. Id.
In Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (App. Div.
1982), the policyholder designed, manufactured, constructed, and installed a self-service
gasoline filling station. The underlying complaint alleged that faulty construction of the
station caused an employee to be injured by the contact with lead in the gasoline. Id.
The court recognized that the policyholder was uninvolved with the operation of the
service station, and thus uninvolved in the polluting activity. Id. at 506.
In Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 439 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539 (App. Div. 1981),
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within this category, eleven hold that the 1970 pollution exclusion
does not defeat coverage.13 5 In the only case holding that the pollution exclusion barred coverage, the court was incorrect in its
analysis. 136
2.

Intentional Polluters

These cases all involve polluters who proximately caused the
polluting discharges and were found to have done so intentionally.
In each of these cases, the policyholder either intentionally discharged the damage-causing pollutants or specifically knew the
damage-causing discharges were occurring and failed to stop
them.1 37 The pollution exclusion was found to defeat coverage in
all seven of the cases falling within this category.
the policyholder, Niagara County, was a defendant in the "Love Canal" litigation, in
which the defendants were charged with recklessly dumping hazardous chemicals. The
policyholder, however, was charged with negligently failing to warn and protect its citizens, failing to remove chemicals from Love Canal, and wrongfully conveying property
without notice of the pollution on the property. Id. The court held that the pollution
exclusion was inapplicable to allegations in which the policyholder was not charged with
any involvement in the hazardous discharges. Id. at 542.
135. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
136. In Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301, 1302 (N.Y.
1989), the policyholder bought land that had been contaminated by the previous owner,
and was then charged with responsibility for its clean-up. Although the policyholder had
no knowledge of the previous owner's polluting activities, the court rejected the argument
that the pollution exclusion was inapplicable because the policyholder was not involved
with the discharge, and applied the pollution exclusion as a bar to coverage. Id. The
court based its decision on the fact that the discharges by the previous owner were intentional. Id.
The proper analysis, however, determines whether the discharge was accidental from
the standpoint of the insured policyholder. See supra part III.B. 1. The fact that a third
party intended the discharge is irrelevant to this analysis because the policyholder in this
case was completely uninvolved in and unaware of the pollution. See Summit Assoc. Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 1235 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (analyzing
a similar fact situation to Powers Chemco and holding that coverage was not barred).
137. In Barmet of Ind., Inc. v. Security Ins. Group., 425 N.E.2d 201, 202 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981), the policyholder owned and operated an aluminum recycling plant, which
produced gases as a by-product of its recycling processes. The policyholder's pollution
control system frequently broke down, sometimes twice a week. Id. Each time it broke
down, it released the gases. Id. The releases prompted numerous complaints about visibility problems on a nearby highway. Id. On one occasion, the escaped gases obscured
visibility on the highway and an individual was killed in a car accident as a result. Id.
Although the policyholder may not have intended the car accident, the court found that
the policyholder intended the injury-causing plant emissions. Id.
In Weber v. IMT Ins. Co., 462 N.W.2d 283, 284 (Iowa 1990), the policyholder, a farm
operator, used hog manure to fertilize crops on the farm. Frequently, the policyholder
transported the hog manure over a public road and often spilled and tracked the manure
onto this road. Id. The underlying complaint alleged that the odor from the hog manure
on the road contaminated another farmer's sweet corn crop. Id. The court found that
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3. Unintentional Polluters
These cases involve policyholders who proximately caused the
polluting discharges, but did so unintentionally. In these cases, the
facts suggest either that the policyholder did not expect the polluting discharges to occur, or that the court found the issue of
whether the policyholder expected the polluting discharges to occur was a question of fact. Of the twenty-three cases falling within
this category, the pollution exclusion was found not to defeat
cov3
four.'
in
coverage
defeat
to
and
cases,
nineteen
in
erage
Of the nineteen cases in which coverage was found, eight involved policyholders who owned underground storage tanks that
leaked their contents into the ground unbeknownst to the policyholder.139 Six of the nineteen cases finding coverage involved a vathe spillage of the manure was intended and that the pollution exclusion barred coverage.
Id. at 287-89.
In Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050
(N.Y. 1989), the policyholder manufactured blood sample machines. As a regular part of
its business, the policyholder discharged production wastes from the manufacture of its
blood sample machines into a nearby creek. Id. The underlying complaint alleged, and
the policyholder admitted, that the discharging of the wastes was knowing and intentional. Id.
In Town of Moreau v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 568 N.Y.S.2d 466, 467 (App. Div.
1991), the policyholder operated a pesticide company. The underlying complaint alleged
that the policyholder knowingly and intentionally buried large quantities of hazardous
chemicals. Id. The policyholder had prior criminal convictions for knowingly dumping
hazardous wastes. Id. at 468.
In Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 376
(N.C. 1986), the policyholder owned and operated a waste hauling business. As part of
this business, the policyholder hauled and disposed of hazardous wastes at a landfill. Id.
The underlying complaint alleged that the policyholder intentionally delivered the hazardous wastes to the landfill, claiming that the waste was not hazardous or contaminated.
Id. The underlying complaint also alleged that the policyholder negligently disposed of
wastes at the landfill. Id.
In Mays v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 653, 655 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), the policyholder owned and operated a paint manufacturing company which generated waste consisting of paint sludge, solvents, and waste water. The policyholder intentionally
discharged these wastes into unlined pits on its property. Id.
In Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212, 213 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), the policyholder operated a water deionization and softening business. In the course of its business,
the policyholder accumulated acids and caustics in a 1200-gallon tank. Id. Each time
the tank reached capacity, the policyholder intentionally discharged the wastes into the
city's sewer system. Id.
138. For cases holding that the pollution exclusion did not defeat coverage, see infra
notes 139-43. For cases holding that the pollution exclusion defeated coverage see infra
notes 144-45.
139. In Shapiro v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 477 N.E.2d 146, 148 (Mass. App. Ct.
1985), the policyholder owned an underground fuel tank, which leaked into surrounding
waterways. Approximately six months prior to being informed that his tank was leaking,
the policyholder had the tank cleaned. Id. at 150 n.2. He was told at that time that the
tank was in good condition. Id. The court distinguished this case from Barmet because
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riety of fact situations which are logically similar to the
underground storage tank cases: two involved landfills that were
designed to contain pollutants but leaked their contents into the
ground contrary to the expectations of the site owner or operator;"' two involved building materials that unexpectedly emitted
the policyholder in Barmet had knowledge of the pollution control system's frequent malfunctions, whereas in Shapiro, the policyholder had no knowledge of the leak or of the
defective condition of his underground fuel tank. Id.
In General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Town Pump, 692 P.2d 427, 428-29 (Mont. 1984), the
policyholder owned underground gasoline storage tanks. Leaks from those tanks contaminated underwater wells of adjoining landowners. Id. at 428. The insurance companies conceded, and the court agreed, that the leaks were not intended. Id. at 429-30.
In Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 528 A.2d 76, 77
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), the policyholder owned property with an underground
gasoline storage tank located on it. The tank leaked gasoline through the soil onto adjacent property. Id. The pollution exclusion was no bar to coverage because substantial
fact questions still existed at the summary judgment stage as to whether the leaks were
unexpected and unintended. Id. at 86.
In New York v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 547 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (App. Div. 1989),
the policyholder owned an underground gasoline storage tank in which there was a very
small leak that continued for a number of years. No evidence existed to suggest the
policyholder was aware of the leak before an investigation by the state Department of
Transportation. Id. at 453.
In Colonie Motors v. Hartford Accident & Indem., 538 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (App. Div.
1989), the policyholder installed an underground containment unit for the purpose of
preventing any discharge of waste oil into the environment. One of the underground
pipes broke, but there was nothing in the record to indicate that the policyholder was
aware of any discharge before the waste oil was found on a neighbor's property. Id.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (App. Div. 1980), the
policyholder installed, maintained, and used an underground gasoline storage tank at an
automobile dealership. Three years after installation, an adjoining landowner complained that his property was damaged by a leak in the tank. Id. The court found that
the negligent installation and maintenance of the storage tank could result in an unexpected and unintended discharge which remained undetected for a period of time. Id.
In United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 664 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1983), the policyholder owned a gasoline service station and leased it to another
individual. Eighty thousand gallons of gasoline leaked out of a hole in an underground
pipe, and continued undetected for a period of several months. Id. The policyholder
knew nothing of the leak. Id.
In Wagner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 427 N.W.2d 854, 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988),
the policyholder owned a gasoline service station. A third party installed a canopy at the
station, and in the process, cracked one of the underground pipes. Id. The cracked pipe
caused a gasoline leak, but it was not discovered for three years. Id. The policyholder
had no knowledge of the leak. Id.
140. In Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem., 451
A.2d 990, 991 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982), the policyholder, a municipal utilities
authority, collected liquid wastes from its system and hauled the wastes to designated,
authorized landfills, where it deposited the wastes. The wastes leaked into the groundwater. Id. While the policyholder intended to deposit the wastes at the designated landfill, as with the underground storage tank cases, the policyholder never intended the
damage-causing discharges to occur. Id. at 994.
In Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Wis. 1990), the policyholder
operated a waste disposal site. The underlying complaint alleged that the disposal site
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pollutants; 4 ' and two involved policyholders who knew their activities resulted in the discharge of pollutants but who did not expect the damage-causing pollutants to be discharged. 142 In the
remaining five of the nineteen cases in which coverage was found,
the court focused on whether the insurance companies had a duty
to defend. 43 In each of these five cases, the court could not deterwas not operated properly and that this lead to environmental damage. Id. While the
underlying complaint alleged that the waste disposal site was operated negligently and in
violation of applicable laws and regulations, it did not allege any particular releases, how
the releases allegedly occurred, or the policyholder's involvement in the allegedly damage-causing release. Id.
141.
In Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988), the policyholder improperly placed a formaldehyde insulation in a home.
The improper installation of the insulation caused formaldehyde to escape into the home.
Id. Although the installation of the formaldehyde insulation was intended, the actual
release of formaldehyde into the home was not intended by the policyholder. Id. at 499.
In Leverence v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 462 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1990), the policyholder manufactured prefabricated homes. According to the underlying complaint, defective design of the walls and roofs and use of improper material
caused the houses to retain excessive moisture. Id. This moisture led to the formation of
mold, which in turn led to the release of airborne contaminants. Id. The growth of mold
in the houses was unexpected and unintended by the policyholder. Id. at 232.
142. In Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Martin, 467 N.E.2d 287, 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984),
the policyholder operated a parking garage adjacent to a condominium complex. The
underlying complaint alleged that carbon monoxide and black soot regularly escaped
from the policyholder's garage into the condominium and damaged the condominium.
Id. Although the policyholder likely expected the release of carbon monoxide and soot
into the garage and the surrounding streets, the court recognized that those releases were
to be distinguished from the release into the condominium structure itself (or into other
residential structures). Id. at 290. The releases into the condominium unit could have
been "sudden and accidental," but this was a question of fact. Id.
In Bentz v. Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 575 A.2d 795, 796 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1990), the policyholder was engaged in the business of pesticide spraying, and was
sued for damage caused by negligent application of the pesticide. Specifically, the underlying complaint alleged that the pesticides were openly sprayed on interior and exterior
surfaces in violation of applicable laws. Id. While the policyholder intended to release
some of the pesticides, the releases which caused the damage were unintended. Id. at
803.
143. In Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Colo.
1991), the policyholder owned stock in a mining company. Two of the mine shafts
drained into a river and caused an accumulation of sedimentary sludge. Id. The underlying complaints charged the policyholder with responsibility for the pollution of the river,
but did not allege that the policyholder expected or intended the damage-causing discharges into the river. Id. at 1088.
In Willett Truck Leasing Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 N.E.2d 376, 377 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980), the policyholder was engaged in the business of leasing trucks. The underlying
complaint alleged that fumes entered the cab of a truck leased by the policyholder due to
the negligent acts or omissions of the policyholder in failing to inspect the truck and
failing to warn the injured party. Id. at 378. The court found that a duty to defend
existed under the general allegations of this complaint because there was a possibility that
the pollution exclusion did not bar coverage. Id. at 381.
In Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 224 (Me. 1980), the underlying
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mine from the allegations of the underlying complaint(s) whether
the discharges had been expected or intended from the point of
view of the policyholder.
Only four cases of the twenty-three cases in this category held
that the 1970 pollution exclusion blocked coverage.'" In one additional unintentional polluter case, the court determined that
although the policyholder did not intend to cause the polluting discomplaint sought damages for contamination of well water allegedly resulting from the
policyholder's operation of an industrial waste facility. The broad and conclusory allegation in the underlying complaint that the pollution was "a result of negligence" did not
describe how the alleged pollution occurred. Id. Thus, it was possible that the releases
fell within the exception to the pollution exclusion clause, and the insurance companies
were under a duty to defend the policyholder in the underlying case. Id.
In Jonesville Prod., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 402 N.W.2d 46, 47 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987), the policyholder was charged in the underlying complaint with discharging
hazardous chemicals on its property as a regular and ongoing business practice. The
underlying complaint did not specify how the toxic wastes entered the ground. Id. at 48.
The court found that a duty to defend the policyholder existed because the underlying
complaint could be read to include intentional or unintentional dumping. Id.
In Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., No. 14597, 1991 WL 11403 *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. January 30, 1991), the policyholder was sued in an underlying case for damage
caused by pollutants released at a landfill. The alleged events leading to the pollution of
the landfill could have been considered unexpected and unintended as phrased in the
underlying complaint. Id. at *3.
144. In International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d
758, 762 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 246 (I11. 1988), the policyholder operated a barrel reconditioning business. As part of its business, the policyholder discharged
waste residues onto the ground. Id. The underlying complaint did not allege whether the
plaintiff intended or expected that waste residues from the barrel processing would leak
into the soil or groundwater. Id. at 766. The court, however, barred coverage based
upon the time period of the discharges, construing "sudden" to mean abrupt. Id. at 769.
In Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. City of Woodhaven, No. 85180, 1991 Mich.
LEXIS 1812, *1 (Mich. Aug. 26, 1991), the policyholder-city was engaged in spraying
pesticides to control insects and other pests. Some of the spray injured a resident of the
city, and the resident sued. Id. Although the allegations of the complaint were consistent with the discharge of pesticide coming into contact with the plaintiff unintentionally-because of a gust of wind, for example-the court held that because the city
intentionally engaged in an activity involving the discharge of pollutants, the discharge
could not be considered "accidental." Id. at * 11. The court's analysis overlooks the
ambiguity of the phrase "the discharge, . . . escape." See supra parts III.B.2., III.C.3.
In Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393, 393
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), the policyholder operated a landfill. The underlying complaint
alleged that methane gas was produced by the landfill and gradually leaked into a basement. Id. at 403. Despite the fact that the policyholder did not intend the damagecausing discharge, the court focused on the "non-abrupt" nature of the discharge and
held that the pollution exclusion barred coverage. Id. at 403-04.
In State v. Mauthe, 419 N.W.2d 279, 280 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), the policyholder was
engaged in the business of chromium plating. Periodically, the policyholder's pollution
control techniques developed cracks and broke down, resulting in accidental dispersals.
Id. Noting that the dispersals were gradual, the court denied coverage under the pollution exclusion because it interpreted "sudden" to mean abrupt or temporally quick. Id.
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charges, it expected those discharges to occur.145
The results of reported state court decisions, therefore, suggest
that the analysis described in the previous section is correct.
V.

CONCLUSION

The insurance industry's 1970 standard form pollution exclusion
is possibly the most ambiguity-ridden example of English prose
ever composed. To navigate this maze of ambiguity successfully,
courts should carefully identify the relevant ambiguities and follow
the guiding principle of construction-that ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be interpreted in favor of coverage.
If the steps outlined in our proposal are consistently followed by
courts, the 1970 pollution exclusion will finally begin to serve the
purpose for which it was drafted; namely, to delineate clearly those
environmental claims that are covered by standard-form CGL policies from those that are not. Specifically, uninvolved liable parties
are covered; intentional polluters are not covered; and unintentional polluters are covered, except when they have ignored a substantial probability that their activities were causing the discharge
of damage-causing pollutants.

145. In Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., Nos. 86906, 86907, 86908, 1991
Mich. LEXIS 1811 (Mich. Aug. 26, 1991), the policyholder manufactured an antibiotic, a
byproduct of which was a toxic chemical waste. The policyholder pumped this toxic
waste into an underground tank for storage. Id. An audit of daily volume readings revealed that the tank had been leaking for three weeks. Id. The court found that the
policyholder expected the leaks to occur shortly after it began pumping. Id.

